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ABSTRACT
ASIKAINEN, ANTTONI
How Hydrocarbon Resources and Vladimir Putin's
Acquaintances are Linked to Russia's Foreign Policy Decisions. Departments of Political Science
and Russian and East European Studies, June 2020
ADVISOR: Kristin Bidoshi & David Siegel
This thesis examines how Russia uses its hydrocarbon resources as a foreign policy tool. As one
of the most significant gas and oil producers in the world, Russia has gained enormous political
power in many nations. In short, for many years, Russia has been building asymmetrical
economic relationships with multiple countries, including countries in the European Union.
Many of these countries have become partially or entirely dependent on Russian energy. It is
true that financially, Russia profits enormously from hydrocarbon exports, but scholars also
agree that for Russia, gaining political power by selling hydrocarbon resources is just as
important. Another way of gaining political influence in a foreign country is to offer subsidies on
energy exports. This tactic has been used primarily in former Soviet countries, mainly because
their economies are rather weak.
We also know that corruption, informal politics, and Vladimir Putin's network of close
acquaintances are deeply rooted in the contemporary Russian business culture. For example,
Russian state-owned energy companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft all have
Putin's close allies as board members. In other words, the Kremlin is able to directly control
virtually all major Russian hydrocarbon exporters. Thus, we can ask "who really benefits from
Russia's natural resources - the Russian nation or a selected group of influential businessmen
close to the Kremlin?" In order to answer this question, Russia's role in Crimea and Africa will
be analyzed. This thesis argues that no matter what business Russia does, including exporting
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cheap gas and oil in return for political influence, building gigantic infrastructural projects in
Crimea, or selling arms in Africa, Putin's close allies always get their 'fair' share of the pie.
Hence, it can be concluded that the Kremlin transfers state-owned wealth to the rich oligarchs,
but Russian citizens also gain something from these transactions: geopolitical security abroad,
which oftentimes translates to domestic security.

iii

Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1
Literature Review ................................................................................................................... 4
Asymmetrical economic relationship as the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy........................... 5
How does Russia build these imbalanced economic relationships? .................................................. 7

Subsidies & Price ..................................................................................................................................................7
Long-term Contracts ............................................................................................................................................8
Gazprom and Rosneft – Glorified weapons for achieving foreign policy goals ....................................................9

From asymmetric relationship to Great Russia – how Russia tries to rebuild its lost empire by
pipeline politics ............................................................................................................................. 10

The fight against NATO and the EU ...................................................................................................................11

Increasing concerns about Russian hydrocarbon exports ............................................................... 12
Who benefits from what? .............................................................................................................. 14

Russia – Africa ...................................................................................................................... 17
Economic reasons – from diamonds to Ak-47s ............................................................................... 17

Central African Republic – a Russian experiment? ............................................................................................24
Challenges – a critical view of Russia’s pivot to Africa .......................................................................................27

Russia and the Crimean Peninsula......................................................................................... 31
Crimean Exclusive Economic Zone – the true treasure of Crimea .................................................... 32
Overview of the oil and gas deposits on the Black Sea shelf ........................................................... 34
Pipelines, bridges, and billions of dollars – how the Kremlin and selected group of prominent
Russian businessmen profit from the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula ................................... 37

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 47
Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 50
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 53

iv

Introduction

This thesis analyzes Russia’s use of its energy resources and argues that Russia uses its
hydrocarbon exports as a foreign policy tool. More specifically, there are four main ways of how
Russia uses its natural energy resources to acquire political power abroad. First, Russia offers
subsidized gas and oil to various countries. Second, Russia pressures its business partners to
sign long-term contracts in order to make them dependent on Russian gas and oil. These two
points are directly interconnected: Russia lays an ‘energy trap’ by offering cheap energy, and
when countries fall into this trap, they are forced to sign lengthy agreements. Third, under
President Vladimir Putin’s rule, the Kremlin has forced gigantic energy companies such as
Gazprom and Rosneft in the hands of the state. In essence, the Russian state has turned major
energy companies into glorified weapons for achieving Moscow’s foreign policy goals. Lastly, in
the last twenty years, Russia has dedicated sizeable amounts of government funds to building
new pipelines to bypass problematic countries.
What is more, this thesis seeks to examine how President Vladimir Putin has successfully
surrounded the Kremlin with a network of prominent Russian businessmen. These same
business figures directly profit from many decisions made in Moscow. As Henry Hale has
argued, in Russia’s political environment personal connections are vital for accomplishing
anything. It is also said that Russia is a world of “patrons and clients, patronage politics, and the
dominance of informal understandings over formal rules.”1 Hence, it must not come as a
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surprise that President Vladimir Putin is often regarded as a “master practitioner of patronal
politics.”2 For example, in 2000, when Putin became the President of Russia, he brought his
network of close acquaintances from St. Petersburg’s Mayor’s Office and KGB to the Kremlin.
Putin has successfully continued building his network, and today, 20 years after Putin took
office for the first time, it can be argued that Putin and his network of allies have infiltrated
every prominent position in the Russian government as well as the private sector.
This thesis is divided into three major chapters: Literature Review, Russia-Africa, and
Russia and the Crimean Peninsula. The first chapter seeks to introduce the existing literature on
the topics discussed above. In essence, many contemporary scholars agree that Russia is, to
some extent, using its energy resources as a foreign policy tool. Moreover, it is clear that Russia
has been building asymmetrical economic relationships with its trading partners in order to gain
political power abroad. Put differently, many countries have become dependent on Russian
energy, and thus Russia has been able to increase its political influence abroad. The first
chapter will also hypothesize that countries can avoid the Russian ‘energy trap’ by establishing
a complex economic relationship with Russia.
Finally, before moving to the next chapter, the first section will examine what Sistema is
and how it affects Russian business culture. In short, Sistema has allowed Putin to transfer
government-owned wealth to his closest allies. Thus, the goal of the subsequent chapters is to
answer the question, “who benefits from what?” In other words, are the profits from the
Russian energy sector going to Putin and his close associates, or does the Russian nation benefit
as well?
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The Russia-Africa chapter argues that Russia is trying to rebuild its influence on the
African continent. The chapter will demonstrate that economics is the primary motivation for
Russia’s interests in Africa. Many African countries are rich in many natural resources; oil,
natural gas, cobalt, gold, and diamonds can be found relatively easily on the African continent.
Russia has understood this untapped potential, and many Russian companies have started
operating in the region. Interestingly, the owners of these Russian companies are Putin’s close
friends. Moreover, there is strong evidence that Russian private military contractors, The
Wagner Group, for instance, are working in many African countries. The Central African
Republic is perhaps the best example.
Other major Russian businesses in Africa are arms exports and the nuclear energy
sector. Both of these industries are controlled by Putin’s allies. For example, the CEO of
Rosoboronexport, a major Russian arms exporter, belongs to Putin’s network. What is more,
Putin’s allies are in charge of the nuclear energy companies operating in Africa. For instance,
Sergey S. Ivanov is a major figure in the Russian nuclear energy sector. This chapter concludes
that although Russia has gained some political influence in a few African countries, monetary
interest (and enriching Putin’s network) is still the main motivator for the Russian operations in
the region.
The last analytical chapter of this thesis, Russia and the Crimean Peninsula, argues that
scholars have neglected to examine the importance of economic reasons behind the
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. There are three key economic reasons why Russia was,
and still is, interested in Crimea. First, there are vast amounts of natural resources, primarily oil
and natural gas, within the Crimean Exclusive Economic Zone. Second, there is a strong
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correlation between the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and recent deals signed between
Russia and China. In short, Russia has agreed to export almost 40 billion cubic meters of natural
gas per annum to China. The agreement was signed for 30 years. In order to fulfill this contract,
Russia needed to find new sources of natural gas. Lastly, this chapter demonstrates how giant
infrastructural building projects in Crimea have become yet another way of transferring Russian
state-owned assets to Putin’s close associates.
Finally, the Conclusion chapter will argue that due to the nature of the political system in
Russia, it is tough to give a definitive answer to the question “who benefits from what.” Putin
has indeed succeeded in disseminating his network of close associates into every aspect of
Russian life. Thus, it can be said that Putin’s allies benefit tremendously from Russia’s natural
riches. However, as I will hypothesize in the final chapter, this does not mean that the Russian
public would not receive any benefit.

Literature Review
The goal of this chapter is to examine the existing literature on how Russia uses its
energy resources as a foreign policy tool. Most of the literature available today acknowledges
that Russia has been rather successful in gaining political power across various countries. One
of the biggest issues for these countries is that they have become dependent on Russian oil and
gas. Dependency is always bad because it creates an asymmetrical economic relationship,
where by one country has more power over the other. The scholars introduced in this chapter
believe that Russia’s main goal with hydrocarbon exports is to gain political influence abroad.
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But the question of who benefits from these energy exports is never answered in the literature
available today. Is there a national or private interest in the energy export industry? In short,
this chapter seeks to convince the reader that hydrocarbon exports are a potent and functional
tool for foreign policy. Nevertheless, it is still unclear who is the ultimate beneficiary of this tool
- the state or private individuals.
I will address these unanswered questions in the subsequent pages. First, I will turn to
explaining how asymmetrical economic relationships have become the foundation of Russian
foreign policy. Moreover, I will argue that via subsidies, price-exploitation, long-term contracts,
and state-owned energy companies, Russia is able to build these imbalanced relationships.
Second, I will discuss the implications of the so-called ‘pipeline-politics.’ In essence, Russia has
been trying to restore its might by building new pipelines across the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) region. Lastly, this chapter will argue that there is a very complex
connection between state-owned energy giants and President Putin’s allies, meaning that it is
not always clear what entity claims the final monetary profit.

Asymmetrical economic relationship as the cornerstone of Russian foreign policy
In essence, an asymmetric relationship “gives the less dependent partner in the relationship
political leverage over the more dependent partner.”3 As stated in the introductory paragraph,
dependency is always bad because it makes countries vulnerable to losing their autonomous
political power to other nations (in this case, Russia). There are two main theoretical concepts
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that make countries susceptible to losing political power via economic aggression. First, it is
vital that the initiating ‘aggressor,’ in this case, Russia, has a bigger economy than the ‘target’
state.4 Second, the trade percentage between an aggressor and the target state should not be
balanced.5 For example, 5.4 percent of Russian exports are shipped to Belarus, but 44 percent
of all Belarus’ exports are sent to Russia.6 Hence, according to the theories discussed above,
Belarus would be an ideal target state.
Historically, scholars such as Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant have hypothesized that
“states are deterred from initiating conflict against their economic partners for fear of losing
the commercial gains produced by their economic relationship.”7 However, Russia would be
able to sustain economic conflicts with most of its trading partners because of the strong
asymmetrical economic relationships. Hence, Smith's and Kant's theories cannot be applied in
Russia's case. Therefore, one could argue that economic interdependence does not reduce
conflicts between Russia and other nations.8 As Krickovich states, in order for countries not to
fall into the ‘Russian energy trap,’ they should develop a complex and symmetrical economic
relationship with Russia.9 The economic relationship between Russia and the European Union is
a good example of this.10 Thus, it could be argued that it is in Russia’s interest to build
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asymmetrical interdependence relationships with as many countries as possible. There is no
doubt that Moscow has gained extraordinary political power in countries such as Belarus and
Georgia by building simple and asymmetric economic relationships with them. In other words,
the majority of the trade between Russia and these countries is concentrated on oil and gas.11

How does Russia build these imbalanced economic relationships?
Subsidies & Price
The main way for Russia to gain political capital via trade is to offer subsidized gas and oil to
various countries. Although selling subsidized goods seems to be against common commercial
logic, it is practiced everywhere in the world. The basic idea is that companies suffer a shortterm economic loss in order to achieve long-term economic gain. However, since companies
such as Gazprom and Rosneft are state-owned businesses, in Russia's case the sought-after
long-term gain is often political power because when energy suppliers gain a quasi-monopolist
status in markets, it rather easily translates into political leverage.12 Moreover, Russia’s target
states are usually not in a position to turn down these ‘good deals’ because their economies are
not strong enough.13 As Newnham argues, Russia often uses such ‘petro-carrots’ to gain
political power. On the other hand, if countries do not agree to Russia’s demands, it might use
so-called ‘petro-sticks’ (halting energy deliveries or increasing prices, for example).14
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In a broader context, these subsidies should be seen as a part of the so-called ‘tap
weapon’ (sometimes referred to as the ‘price weapon’).15 Simply put, a tap weapon means that
Russia can cancel gas and oil exports at any time if a country does not agree to pay a certain
price on the energy or if a country refuses to implement ‘friendly’ policies.16 Despite the fact
that gas and oil exports produce a lot of wealth for Russia, Russia is not afraid of using the tap
weapon because the economic aspect is often trumped by political motives.17 In fact, Kanet
argues that “almost from the very inception of the new Russian Federation, Moscow has used
its control of energy as a means to influence other former Soviet republics to change political
positions that they had taken or to follow Moscow’s policy lead.”18 In other words, Russia has
been using the tap weapon to form asymmetrical economic relationships between itself and
other countries from the early 1990s, and thus has gained political power in its near abroad.

Long-term Contracts

Stacy Closson has hypothesized that “Russia uses its energy supplies as part of an effort to
expand political influence over Central and Eastern European (CEE) states.”19 Essentially,
according to this theory, Russia wants to change the energy reliance of CEE states to energy
dependence by forcing them to sign long-term energy contracts with Russian hydrocarbon
exporters. This can be directly linked to the long-term gains discussed earlier – Russia sells
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cheap gas and oil to certain countries, locks them into long contracts, and as a result, gains
political capital. Furthermore, since these contracts are often signed for multiple years, Russia is
able to demand small changes over the years. For example, Russia could pressure countries to
change certain figures in the administration, and after a few years, the administration could be
full of pro-Russian policymakers.

Gazprom and Rosneft – Glorified weapons for achieving foreign policy goals

Some scholars have argued that “a key ingredient in Russia’s ability to use its resource
abundance as an instrument of foreign policy has been President Vladimir Putin’s successful
strategy of consolidating Russian energy muscle in the hands of the state.”20 For example,
under President Putin’s rule, the state has turned companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft into
state-owned enterprises. Even though these companies are magnificent cash cows for the
state, their entire strategy is in fact driven by national interest rather than commercial logic.21
Gazprom and Rosneft have become so powerful and important that some scholars even argue
that these companies are the two main weapons the Kremlin is using to achieve its foreign
policy goals.22
Since there are no globally standardized laws concerning natural gas exports, gas is an
excellent tool for gaining political leverage. The Kremlin has converted Gazprom from a simple
natural gas producing and exporting company to an effective and lethal political weapon.

20
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Scholars often cite differential gas pricing between countries, the threat of gas interruptions,
and halting of gas flows as examples of how Gazprom, the state-owned gas giant, is used to
manipulate other countries’ politics.23 Furthermore, Gazprom owns most of the profitable gas
reserves in Russia and controls virtually all gas pipelines.24 Gazprom’s tentacles reach
international gas pipelines as well – Gazprom usually has a majority ownership in all pipelines it
uses for transportation. As I will argue further in this chapter, the control of natural gas
pipelines is vital for Russian influence. Hence, it could be argued that even before Gazprom sells
any natural gas, the Russian government already possesses political power due to Gazprom's
control of the pipelines.

From asymmetric relationship to Great Russia – how Russia tries to rebuild its lost empire
by pipeline politics
Arguably, Russia’s biggest stumbling block in its aspirations to gain political leverage in various
countries is its lost pipeline dominance. Russia has become dependent on transit countries to
handle Russian gas and oil exports. Thus, some scholars hypothesize that Russia uses ‘pipeline
politics’ to rebuild Moscow’s lost empire.25 In essence, this means that Russia is constantly
building new pipelines by bypassing ‘problematic’ countries. Nord Stream pipelines are a good
example of this strategy. Pipeline politics also explain why Russia has been so eager to gain
political capital in the CIS region; Russia does not want to be dependent on anything or anyone.
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However, Nygren writes that Russia is not necessarily going directly after pure political
control in the CIS region. Rather, it is slowly acquiring or re-acquiring the control of the energy
and transit resources from the Soviet era. Subsequently, Russia is slowly gaining economic and
political control of the region. Naturally, Russia is also seeking to achieve geopolitical security
throughout the region.26 In fact, Nygren argues that by using pipeline politics, Russia has been
very successful in its aspirations to re-build ‘Great Russia’: “many of the former Soviet republics
[have become] more or less economically, socially, and politically integrated with Russia.”27
It should be mentioned that the CIS region has always been somewhat integrated into
Russia (because of their shared history), but at least on paper, the CIS countries are sovereign
states, which are able to make autonomous decisions. The fear of Western influence near its
borders is one of the biggest reasons Russia is so interested in maintaining friendly and robust
relationships with CIS countries. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that Russia is, fairly
successfully, using its natural energy resources as a foreign policy tool. Otherwise, Russia would
have used more ‘hard power’ (like they did in the Crimea incident) in the CIS region.

The fight against NATO and the EU

It is a commonly accepted theory that energy-rich states usually use their energy resources
solely for defensive purposes in order to ensure the continuation of the regime, to consolidate
power at home, and prevent outside ‘intrusion.’28 However, Russia has been particularly
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aggressive towards countries that have tried to escape Russia’s sphere of influence by opening
a dialogue with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU). It
would be foolish to think that incidents in Ukraine (gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia in
2006) and Georgia (energy crisis between Georgia and Russia in 2006) were merely a defensive
action from the Russian government. As Korteweg observes, countries that are not part of the
NATO or the EU, are more vulnerable to Russian energy blackmail. Using energy weapon for
aggressive purposes has been Russia’s standard method of warning countries what happens if
they make decisions that are against Moscow’s interests.

Increasing concerns about Russian hydrocarbon exports

For many nations Russian energy is a real problem. Countries have to make decisions between
accepting cheap Russian energy and conceding some political power to Russia or paying very
high prices for energy but maintaining their sovereign decision making. Unfortunately, many
former Soviet countries, Belarus, for instance, have decided to sign long-term energy contracts
for importing cheap Russian energy, and thus have lost some political sovereignty. It has to be
mentioned that oftentimes the former Soviet countries are forced to sign these contracts
because they would not be able to pay the higher prices for energy.
Ivanenko argues that the world should be increasingly concerned about the Kremlin’s
use of the energy weapon because “Russian leaders…have learned through hard experience
that they need to respond to public demands for assertive foreign policy or risk losing

12

authority.”29 Thus, one could argue that Russian leaders are ready to use Russia’s energy
resources as a tool of foreign policy in order to stay in power. Ivenko writes that especially since
2003, the government has gained tremendous amounts of influence on what comes to the
Russian energy sector, and thus the government is now capable of using companies such as
Gazprom and Rosneft as tools in foreign policy.30 However, it is quite interesting that “the
Kremlin upholds national energy interests abroad but at the cost of high taxation at home.”31
This would imply that foreign policy goals are extremely important for Russia, and that Russia is
ready to sacrifice its domestic well-being in order to achieve its goals near abroad.
On the other hand, some argue that Russia is merely doing business, just like every
other country with abundant natural gas and oil resources. Not so surprisingly, Western
companies that are heavily invested in the Russian energy sector vigorously defend this
theory.32 Obviously, the Russian state apparatus also constantly claims that what they are doing
makes good business sense. Furthermore, these same entities support Russia’s plans to build
new sea pipelines into Europe. Europe’s energy security is not a concern for these companies
because they argue that Europe is not dependent on Russia’s energy. While it is true that
Europe is not completely dependent on Russia in this matter, Europe is in fact reliant on
Russian hydrocarbon exports. I find this second theory to be rather flawed: if Europe is already
reliant on Russian energy, would not buying more energy from Russia shift the balance towards
dependence? Thus, I would argue that even if Russia is just conducting business, there still lies
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an inherent problem that Russia is gaining more and more political power in its sphere of
influence (especially when we consider European Union). As I have shown, Russia’s energy
weapon is a real threat.

Who benefits from what?
As stated previously, under President Putin’s regime, Russia has been consolidating the energy
weapon in the hands of the government. What is more, some scholars think that Putin’s role in
companies like Gazprom and Rosneft is more prominent than most people know. Henderson
argues that Putin has “very significant influence over [Gazprom], not just by virtue of the state’s
51% stake but also through the appointments of senior management – most of whom are old
associates of government ministers.”33 For example, the CEO of Gazprom is Alexey Miller, who
is Putin’s old associate from the St. Petersburg’s Mayor’s office. Other members of Gazprom’s
management committee also have close links to Putin or the government. Thus, it is quite clear
that “there is a complex interaction between public and private actors in Russia’s gas sector.”34
It is worth mentioning that Gazprom is not the only state-owned energy company in
which Putin’s close associate is acting as the director. Rosneft’s CEO is Igor Sechin, one of the
most trusted allies of Vladimir Putin. Sechin used to work as Putin’s subordinate in St.
Petersburg, and later Sechin held various high-ranking positions in Putin’s Presidential
Administration. What is more, Transneft’s (state-owned oil pipeline company) director is
Nikolay Tokarev, who is a Russian oligarch and belongs to Putin’s inner circle. It has been said
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34

Henderson, J., 2016. Does Russia Have a Potent Gas Weapon? 462.
Kivinen, M., 2012. Public and business actors in Russia's energy policy, 50.

14

that “Tokarev’s rise to prominence in Russia’s state-dominated energy sector can be traced
back to his early career, when he became a close ally of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin during his
KGB days.”35
There are numerous other companies in different business sectors where the directors
have direct connections to Putin and his allies. It is quite evident that Putin has built a very
complex system in which every major Russian state-owned company is managed by people
from Putin’s inner circle. This system is often referred to as Sistema. For example, Kimberly
Marten has argued that Sistema is Putin’s network of wealthy and powerful individuals who
have consolidated immense amounts of power in the Kremlin.36 Thus, a small group of
businessmen are able to control the entire country. This obviously gives Putin immeasurable
political and economic power within and outside of Russia. For example, Putin could singlehandedly decide on increasing or decreasing oil and gas prices for certain countries.
Russia’s business sector operates and navigates between formal and informal rules.
Complex patron-client relationships are not uncommon in the Russian business culture. In fact,
Korteweg has argued that Russia has exported this idea outside its borders: countries are
expected to behave like clients of Moscow, and nations, which have proved to be loyal clients,
have received notable discounts on gas prices.37 This begs the questions does Putin benefit
from the Russian energy industry? Is it true that “Gazprom…makes business directly with the
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President of Russia?”38 Does Putin’s network gain monetary benefit? Or is it just political? The
existing literature on Russia’s energy weapon fails to answer these questions.
It is evident that Russia is using its hydrocarbon exports as a tool for foreign policy. It
could also be argued that at every possible step, someone takes their ‘fair’ share of the
‘hydrocarbon pie.’ An important question is, who gets the biggest slice – Russia as a nation or
Putin and his Sistema? In order to answer this, a deeper dive into Russian politics must be done.
The following chapters discuss the significance of Russia’s presence in Africa and Crimea. For
instance, Russian companies operating in African countries have direct links to Putin’s Sistema,
and thus the Kremlin. Furthermore, it will be argued that the situation in the Crimean Peninsula
is rather similar: firms tasked with building enormous infrastructural developments are owned
by Putin’s associates.

38
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Russia – Africa
After the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Russia’s footprint in Africa declined
considerably. For example, Russia “closed nine embassies, three consulates, and a variety of
trade missions and student exchange programs.”39 Nevertheless, in the last 20 years, Russia has
been trying to increase its presence on the African continent. Russia has been especially active
since 2014. Although there are a number of reasons why Russia is suddenly more interested in
Africa, in this chapter I will argue that economics are the main rationale for Russia’s sudden
attention to Africa. Nevertheless, as I will also hypothesize, it is possible that by gaining more
influence on the African continent, Russia is trying to improve its situation on an international
playing field.

Economic reasons – from diamonds to Ak-47s

Between February and March of 2014, Russia seized the Crimean Peninsula. Subsequently,
harsh economic sanctions were imposed on prominent Russian business figures, many of whom
are President Vladimir Putin’s close associates. Hence, it could be argued that after the events
in 2014, Russia needed to start looking into new potential revenue streams. Nataliya Bugayova
and Darina Regio argue that the “Kremlin views Africa as an avenue to boost its economy
without reform by developing new revenue streams and undermining the sanctions imposed by

39
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the West.”40 Kimberly Marten also hypothesizes that one reason for Russia’s contemporary
presence in Africa is that it is searching for new markets because of the 2014 sanctions.41 In
essence, Russia is trying to find resources it can extract from Africa, as well as find new markets
for arms trade, for example.
One of the new potential income streams could be a variety of African natural
resources. Adibe argues that “Russian companies are scaling up their activities in the mining of
resources such as coltan, cobalt, gold, and diamonds.”42 For example, a Russian company
named Alrosa has made vast investments into the diamond mining sector in Zimbabwe and
Angola. Furthermore, Nordgold, a Russian owned gold mining company, has relatively new
investments in Burkina Faso. Even the state-owned Rostec made an enormous deal to grow and
develop a platinum mine in Zimbabwe. 43 44
All of these companies have direct ties to the Kremlin and thus Putin. First, the CEO of
Alrosa, Sergey S. Ivanov, is the son of Putin’s close associate Sergei B. Ivanov, a former KGB
agent, and deputy FSB director under Putin. He also acted as a defense minister during 20012007. Both men hold significant power in Russia through their connections and ownerships.45
Second, Nordgold is owned by Severstal, which is controlled by Alexei Mordashov, who bought
the company during the Russian privatization boom in the 1990s. Today, Mordashov is
"increasingly close to President Putin, with whom he [even] had a televised meeting."46 In fact,
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Mordashov was placed on an international sanctions list because of his ties with Putin and
other business elite in Russia. Lastly, it is only natural that Rostec, a Russian state-owned
company, is under Moscow's direct supervision. The Director-General of Rostec, Sergey
Chemezov, has been Putin's trusted ally for over 30 years. The two first met in Dresden in 1983
when they lived in the same apartment complex. Both worked for the KGB at the time.47
On the other front, Gazprom has signed deals regarding natural gas production projects
in Algeria, and Zarubeshneft has shown interest in oil production projects in Angola and DRC. 48
What is more, in 2018 a Nigerian oil and gas company Oranto Petroleum announced that it “will
be cooperating with Russia’s largest oil producer Rosneft to develop 21 oil assets across
Africa.”49 There is a number of other investments made by Russian companies in several African
countries – and many of Putin’s associates, the notorious Yevgeny Prigozhin, for example, are
behind these companies.
Prigozhin's path to becoming one of Putin's most trusted acquaintances is rather
unique: "at the age of 18 he was sentenced for stealing and in 1981 he was also sentenced to
twelve years imprisonment under articles of robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in
prostitution." In the end, Prigozhin spent nine years behind the bars. Following his release in
1990, he opened a fast-food business, which later evolved into a restaurant and a catering
imperium. It is said that St. Petersburg’s political elite visited Prigozhin's restaurants frequently,
and thus Prigozhin became friends with Putin. Once Putin became the President, Prigozhin’s
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catering empire started receiving massive catering contracts for schools and the military. For
example, in 2012, Prigozhin's "companies got over 90% of catering contracts in military units."
Thus, one could argue that in light of the facts above, Russia has both national and
private interests involved in Africa. Putin’s allies gain profits via their companies, and Russian
government gains political influence wherever these companies operate because the owners
and directors of these firms have very close ties with the Kremlin. Subsequently, political
influence might lead to more economic cooperation.
The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), which is “one of Moscow’s best-known
and authoritative think tanks,” has argued that in recent years the trade between Russia and
Africa has increased vastly.50 51 Moreover, RIAC seems to agree with other Russia-Africa reports
regarding Russia’s economic interest in the region: “major Russian companies actively invest in
Africa…priority sectors for investment include energy and mining, as well as infrastructure,
transport, manufacturing and agriculture.”52 It must be mentioned that RIAC is very biased in its
publications – in the end, it was founded by Dmitry Medvedev to lead Russia’s soft power
campaigns across the world.53 Nonetheless, as Figure 1 in Appendix shows, Russia’s exports to
Africa have been growing steadily. In fact, Russia doubled its exports in just seven years.
Russia’s aspirations to grow its nuclear energy markets should also be put under
economic reasons. Adibe has argued that the “lack of affordable, reliable electricity in Africa
makes the region a prime and lucrative location for Russia’s energy and power industry.”54
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Valdai Discussion Club, another Russian think tank, mentions that “Russia has considerable
experience in the construction of nuclear power plants and modern nuclear technology with
post-Fukushima safety enhancements.”55 For example, Rosatom is building four nuclear power
plants in Egypt and developing an existing nuclear plant in Nigeria. Furthermore, Egypt signed a
60-year service contract with Rosatom.56 57 In total, Russia has signed almost 20 agreements to
build and develop nuclear power plants across Africa.58 However, building and developing the
plants is not the only reason Russia is interested in this sector; Bugayova and Regio hypothesize
that “Russia likely seeks to create a market for the full range of nuclear-related services
including engineer training, fuel provision, and physical security.”59 One could argue that
Russia’s ultimate goal of the entire nuclear business in Africa is to make the African countries
dependent on Russian services and knowledge (as this would create a continuous cash stream
for Moscow).
On the other hand, it could be argued that the entire nuclear energy hype in Africa is yet
another way of enriching Russian oligarchs. For instance, Sergey S. Ivanov has “served on the
board of directors of Atmostroieksport, the state agency that manages all of Russia’s foreign
nuclear projects.”60 Furthermore, at least in the past, Rosatom has gotten gigantic loans from
banks, which have been administrated by Putin’s allies. Good examples would be Sberbank,
which was managed by Herman Gref (Putin’s colleague in St. Petersburg’s mayor’s office) and
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VTB directed by Andrei Kostin (a former KGB operative).61 This is yet another example of why it
is so hard to conclusively categorize Russia’s actions to private or national interest categories.
Hence, it is my conclusion that the nuclear energy business between Russia and Africa is driven
by both, the national and private economic interests.
Arms sales could be divided into its own category because of the geopolitical
implications, but for the purposes of this study I will consider them to be under the ‘economic
umbrella.’ Today, the Russian Federation is the “largest supplier of arms to Africa, accounting
for over a third of all arms exports to the continent.”62 Adibe argues that “Russian arms are
attractive to African leaders because, besides being relatively cheap, deals with Russia are not
often held up by human rights concerns cited by other countries like France and the U.S.”63
Russia’s strongest sub-region in terms of arms sales is North Africa, accounting for
almost 50 percent of total sales in Africa. For example, in 2014-2018, almost seventy percent of
Algeria’s arms imports came from Russia.64 Sub-Saharan Africa also imports vast amounts of
Russian weapons – 28 percent of all arms imports in 2014-2018 was from Russia. Naturally,
arms sales are a very lucrative business for Russia and Putin’s friends: “currently, exports of
Russian-made weapons and military equipment to Africa amount to 4.6 billion USD annually,
with a contract portfolio worth over 50 billion USD.”65 Furthermore, besides Mi helicopters,
Sukhoi and MiG planes, Pantsir-C1 and Kornet-E missile defense systems, tanks, and small arms,
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the Russian Defense Ministry is involved in selling ‘education of army personnel’ (sending
Russian soldiers to train African troops) for various African countries.66
Arms sales are also a very profitable business for Russian oligarchs. For example, Rostec,
which is led by Chemezov, controls Rosoboronexport, which is the “only state-controlled
intermediary in the area of exports and imports of the entire range of military technologies and
services.”67 The CEO of Rosoboronexport is Alexander Mikheev, who recently bought a
multimillion-dollar mansion.68 Thus, as is the case with the nuclear energy business, arms sales
in Africa certainly enrich a handful of Russian business moguls. Nevertheless, because the state
is so heavily involved in arms exports business, it would be reasonable to think that at least
some of the profits come back to the Russian state, and hence the public.
Some reports suggest that the West can only blame itself for Russia’s increased
(military) influence in Africa. For example, when “United Kingdom and the United States were
slow to respond to Nigeria’s request for help, Nigeria turned to Russia for counter-terrorism
training.”69 Moreover, scholars have argued that the West has not done enough to protect
African countries from dictators, for example. Nevertheless, one should not forget the
importance of the Soviet legacy in Africa. First, Russia never was a colonizer in Africa. As
scholars at Valdai Discussion Club argue, “Russia has never subjugated Africa, neither politically
nor economically, and does not carry the burden of slave trade.”70 In fact, the Soviet Union
backed many of the anti-colonial movements in the region.
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Second, during the Cold War, Russia “had long-term access to bases in Egypt, Libya,
Algeria, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Guinea.”71 Because of this, many of the African
countries see Russia as a trustworthy partner, and thus, Russia’s ‘new’ military presence in the
region is not surprising. Moreover, Bugayova and Regio argue that Russia took advantage of
historic relationships when signing military cooperation agreements with almost thirty African
countries.72 Figure 2 in the Appendix shows all African countries with whom Russia currently
has some sort of cooperation or agreements. Figure 3 specifies some military cooperation
agreements signed by Russia and various African states since 2015. It should be mentioned that
the historic relationship between Russia and various African countries is not limited to only
military cooperation. For example, in 1968, “more than 500 Soviet instructors and teachers
were working in Africa.”73 Moreover, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided generous
economic aid for building schools and school related infrastructure in Africa.

Central African Republic – a Russian experiment?
Jakob Hedenskog argues that Russia wants to build good relations with African countries
via military ties because it wants to improve its situation in the United Nations (UN). In short,
Russia seeks to get votes (in the UN) from African countries on various issues such as the
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.74 In fact, former national security advisor John Bolton
believes that Russia “continues to sell arms and energy in exchange for votes at the United
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Nations – votes that keep strongmen in power, undermine peace and security, and run counter
to the best interests of the African people.”75 Nevertheless, Russia’s methods of gaining support
have changed since the Soviet times. Hedenskog mentions that unlike during the Cold War,
modern Russia is using “private military companies as tools for expanding and promoting
Russian interests” in Africa.76 These private companies are then partly used to extract gold,
diamonds, and other precious materials from Africa. Subsequently, the owners of these
companies, who almost always are connected to the Kremlin, obtain enormous monetary
profits. Officially authorizing or silently approving the use of private military contractors (PMC)
in Africa is one of the ways how Moscow, and Putin in particular, rewards his allies for staying
loyal.
The Central African Republic is perhaps the most blatant example of how Russia gains
political and economic influence in an African country. In a statement (given on 02/07/2019)
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, an American military commander working in
Africa stated the following: “in the Central African Republic, Russia has bolstered its influence
with increased military cooperation including donations of arms, with which it has gained
access to markets and mineral extraction rights [and] with minimal investment, Russia
leverages private military contractors such as the Wagner Group, and in return receive political
and economic influence beneficial to them.”77
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The Wagner Group is a notorious private military contractor, which has operated in
Nigeria, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, and now the Central African Republic (CAR).78
The Wagner Group is mainly linked to a Russian businessman Prigozhin, but some scholars have
hypothesized that maybe Wagner was created by the Russian military intelligence agency
Glavnoye razvedyvatelnoye upravleniye (GRU) to provide plausible deniability for Moscow.79
Whatever the truth, Wagner has now rooted itself into the CAR. Marten states that “private
Russian firms associated with Prigozhin are gaining mining concessions in return for having
Wagner train the African states’ security forces.”80 It is also highly likely that Wagner is
providing protection for prominent government officials as well as guarding the gold and
diamond mines. Moreover, CAR’s President Faustin-Archange Touadéra now has a new national
security advisor – Valery Zakharov, who is a former Russian intelligence officer.81
Reynolds has argued that PMCs, and Wagner Group in particular, are just another
foreign policy tool for the Kremlin. He hypothesizes that the Russian government has played a
crucial role in helping Russian companies to sign mining deals in CAR. Furthermore, Reynolds
mentions that these deals have no significance for the Russian economy as a whole. Rather,
they are “payoffs to Prigozhin, helping him to finance and profit from Wagner in return for
aiding the Kremlin’s foreign policy ambitions.”82 Nevertheless, it is obvious that Russia has
gained massive political influence in the Central African Republic. It still not entirely clear
whether Russia is genuinely interested in increasing its influence in CAR or if Russia is
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conducting an ‘experiment’ (experimenting how swiftly and easily Russia can gain certain
amount of political and economic control in a country).
It should be mentioned that CAR is one of the least developed countries on earth and its
geopolitical importance is rather insignificant. Thus, whatever Russia is doing in CAR has not yet
had real impact on a larger scale. However, if the experience from the ‘CAR experiment’ is
good, there is no reason why Russia would not use similar tactics in other countries as well,
perhaps even outside the African continent. What is more, while the geopolitical implications
are rather minor, the people behind the PMCs and mining companies are gaining gigantic
profits. Hence, it can be concluded that a significant reason for conducting the ‘CAR
experiment’ seems to be rewarding Putin’s acquaintances. Nevertheless, as discussed above,
Central African Republic, for example, has voting rights in the UN. This means that Russia’s
political influence in CAR could directly translate into political capital in the UN. Therefore, it
would be reasonable to consider that Russia has some national interest involved in this
situation.

Challenges – a critical view of Russia’s pivot to Africa

Even though the Kremlin has been reasonably successful in increasing its political and economic
significance in various African countries, there is no doubt that Russia will face a number of
difficulties in Africa. One of the most vocal critics has been Kimberly Marten, who argues that
there are four major reasons why Russia's pivot to Africa will fail or at least face serious
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challenges. First, Marten reasons that Russia is simply late to the game since the United States,
the European Union, and China have developed diverse connections and investments with
many African countries.83 Also, Marten sees Russia’s history with African countries as a liability:
“Moscow is saddled with a burden of distrust after it left most of its old allies hanging in the
early 1990s.”84 Thus, Marten claims that because of the mistrust stemming from the events in
the 1990s (when Russia’s economy crashed, it swiftly deserted its African partners),
contemporary leaders of African states could be reluctant to do business with Russia.85
Nevertheless, because the current political situation in Russia is rather stable, this is an unlikely
scenario.
The second reason Russia may face difficulties in Africa is Russia’s stagnating economy
and low levels of innovation and growth. Russia’s economy is still heavily dependent on
hydrocarbon exports and thus any global economic turmoil, especially in the energy sector, will
have a serious impact on the entire Russian economy. What is more, Russia’s deals in Africa
have focused only on Russian markets (i.e. only bilateral trade agreements), while China’s “Belt
and Road Initiative promises increased access to global markets.”86 Hence, it could be possible
that African countries choose to do business with China instead of Russia. Partly because of
this, some scholars have argued that Russia’s economic impact in Africa is much smaller than
one would think.87 Moreover, Kalika hypothesizes that Russian companies “have a vital need to
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export to markets that are not subject to sanctions [and thus] Russia now needs Africa more
than Africa needs Russia.”88
Marten argues that the third reason for Russia’s challenges in Africa is the fact that no
matter how much effort Russia puts into pressuring African countries to vote in favor of Russia
in the United Nations, the United States, for example, will always have its veto power. Thus, it is
unlikely that Russia will be able to pass any crucial decisions with help from the African states.
More specifically, African countries can only participate in the General Assembly (GA) votes.
Although the GA resolutions have significance, “they do not come with any enforcement
mechanism.”89 That is not to say that Russia could not benefit from African votes, at least when
voting about ‘less important’ things. For example, these resolutions could have impact how and
where Russian companies and businesses can operate. Since Putin’s allies are associated with
so many firms, this kind of a UN resolution could have impact on further strengthening Putin’s
and his network’s support in Russia (Putin delivers more business opportunities to oligarchs via
UN, and thus the patron-client relationship strengthens).
Ironically, according to Marten, the most crucial reason for the lack of Russia’s potential
influence in Africa is that “Moscow is operating under an individualistic, patronage-based
model of politics and business, where corrupt factors are exchanged…on the basis of
longstanding personal loyalties, but no lasting institutional relationships are built.”90 In short,
this means that Putin, for example, delivers business opportunities to his friends, who in return
support Putin’s political agenda. One of the best examples of this is the Russian media industry:
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virtually all major news outlets in Russia are state-owned and operated. Moreover, the
directors of these agencies have direct or indirect linkages to the Kremlin. For instance, the
Director General of TASS, Sergey Mikhaylov, “worked as an adviser to Vladimir Yakunin [who] is
a longtime intimate associate and business partner of President Vladimir Putin.”91 Also, by
following the ownership structures of all major media outlets in Russia, one can find linkages to
many banks, which have been connected to Putin’s inner circle – Gazprombank, Bank Rossiya,
and Sberbank, to name a few.
Although some African leaders have adopted this ‘patron-client’ way of conducting
politics (CAR, for example), the general trend on the African continent seems to be that
countries are slowly shifting away from dictatorships. Marten argues that “democratic ideas
have become entrenched across African populations, even if corruption and repression still
hinder true liberal democratic institutionalization in many places.”92 In other words, if Russia
wants to continue building truly strong and lasting political and economic relationships with
African countries, Russia cannot continue using patron-client style politics and business in Africa
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Russia and the Crimean Peninsula
Arguably, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has been the most significant geopolitical
conflict in the last decade. Historically speaking, the Crimean Peninsula belonged to Russia for
almost 200 years from the late 1700s until the mid-1950s. In 1954, the President of the Soviet
Union Nikita Khrushchev, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, decided to transfer the
ownership of the Crimean Peninsula to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Peninsula
remained as Ukrainian territory until 2014 when Russian aggression in the region started. In
short, scholars agree that there are three main reasons why Russia decided to take over the
Crimean Peninsula.
First, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is stationed in Sevastopol, a city in the Southern Crimea.
Prior to 2014, Russia had been leasing the warm water ports for its navy. It has always been in
Russia’s interest to secure its access to the Black Sea forever, and one of the ways was is to
become the de-facto owner of the Crimean Peninsula. Second, in the 2010s, due to the
Euromaidan, Ukraine faced a number of upheavals on its domestic front. Pro-Western
protesters and rioters were regularly on the streets demanding more cooperation with the
European Union, for example. As a result, Russia “viewed the prospect of integration with the
West as a threat to its sphere of influence” and decided to make a decisive move to secure the
control of the geopolitically important Peninsula. 93 Third, Russia’s use of unconventional proxy
war tactics in the annexation, such as sending the ‘Little Green Men’ to Crimea, was clearly a
warning of what might happen if Russia feels threatened within its sphere of influence.
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Naturally, the warning was targeted primarily towards the members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States.
The following chapter argues that there is a fourth important reason behind the
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula – an economic reason. In essence, I argue that Russia as a
nation, as well as private individuals close to the Kremlin, have been profiting and will be able
to profit financially from the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The economic dimension is
further divided into three sub-categories, which are 1) extraction of natural resources, such as
oil and shale gas, from the Black Sea shelf, 2) the relationship between Crimea and the recent
Russia-China gas exporting contract, and 3) how Crimean infrastructural projects have become
just another platform to transfer Russian state-owned wealth to Vladimir Putin’s acquaintances.

Crimean Exclusive Economic Zone – the true treasure of Crimea
There are many significant reasons why Russia decided to annex Crimea. The Peninsula offers
warm water ports for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, from a geopolitical perspective Crimea is
located in a very strategic position on the coast of the Black Sea, and Vladimir Putin managed to
increase his approval ratings after the incident.94 However, the real treasure rests in the
Crimean Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ, see Map 1). According to the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the EEZ is the sea area adjacent to the coastal territory, not extending
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Map 1 Crimean EEZ. Source: "As Russia Closes In On Crimea's Energy Resources, What Is Next For Ukraine?"

beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. It has
been estimated that the “claimed maritime zone around Crimea added about 36,000 square
miles to Russia’s existing holdings…the addition is more than three times the size of the
Crimean landmass.”95
Within the EEZ, the owner has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the seabed and its subsoil [and]
production of energy from the water, currents, and winds.”96 In other words, this means that
Russia owns all natural resources found within the Crimean EEZ. Moreover, Russia has the right
to decide how those resources are used, who has the right to use them, and when those assets
are used. Understanding the significance of the Crimean EEZ is fundamental for this study
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because without the UNCLOS, it is possible that Russia would not be the undisputed owner of
the Crimean natural resources within the 200-mile radius from the coast.

Overview of the oil and gas deposits on the Black Sea shelf
Unfortunately, there is only little detailed information available about the potential oil and gas
reserves on the Black Sea shelf within the Crimean Exclusive Economic Zone. As Keypour and
Hendla have argued, “when it comes to the Crimean energy resources, no unanimously
accepted prognoses are available.”97 Nevertheless, by gathering information from multiple
different sources, it is possible to present a very rough idea of the potential resources. For
example, the three tables below show the estimates of ‘KT-Energy,’ which is a consultancy
company on nontraditional energy and carbon emission reduction projects (for the location of
these fields, see Map 2). Other sources estimate that the “Crimean territory has 44
hydrocarbon fields, 7 gas condensate reservoirs, and 10 oil and 27 gas fields…natural gas
reserves of 165.3 billion cubic meters, 47 million tons of oil and 18.2 million tons of gas
condensate.”98 To put this into perspective, it is estimated that in 2018, Russia produced 669
billion cubic meters of natural gas and 11 million barrels of oil per day (approximately 1.5
million tons of oil).99
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It should be mentioned that most of the gas available within the Crimean EEZ is socalled unconventional gas, or shale gas. As Zhiltsov explains, “natural shale gas refers to
unconventional hydrocarbons, and it is a variety of natural gas [which means that] natural gas is
trapped in clay shales, coalbed methane and tight gas in dense sandstones, occurring at great
depths under not high pressure in geological zones.”100 Naturally, the exploration and
extraction costs of shale gas are very high. For example, it is estimated that extracting 1000
cubic meters of shale gas costs around 20-40 USD.101 Thus, Russia would need to spend
astronomical amounts of money to get its hands on these resources.
Nonetheless, it could be argued that prior to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula,
the Kremlin was well aware of these costs, and thus some state-owned Russian companies
might start operating in the region in the near future. Also, with large initial investments, the
extraction rates for shale gas can be dramatically increased, meaning that Gazprom, for
example, could start extracting substantial amounts of shale gas very quickly. If the Kremlin
decides to invest state money into this, it is quite likely that companies associated with Putin’s
acquaintances will be given some extraction rights in the area. It remains to be seen which
companies will be given these extraction privileges. Another possibility could be selling Crimean
gas extraction licenses to foreign companies, just like Ukraine did prior to the annexation. This
would allow Russia to gather risk-free revenue, but the potential profits would be far less than
if Russia extracted the resources itself. Hence, it is improbable that Russia would sell licenses
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because Russia desperately needs the natural resources and many companies are barred from
doing business in Crimea because of the international economic sanctions.

Table 1: Prikerchenska Area
Area size, square km.
Sea depth at the site
Potential yearly extraction rate
Potential reserves

12960
300-2000 meters
4 million tonnes of oil, 4.5 billion cubic
meters of natural gas
Unknown, needs more investment into
exploration

Table 2: Skifska Area
Area size, square km.
Sea depth at the site
Potential yearly extraction rate
Potential reserves

16000
300-2000 meters
10 billion cubic meters of natural gas
200-250 billion cubic meters of natural gas

Table 3: Forosa Area
Area size, square km.
Sea depth at the site
Potential yearly extraction rate
Potential reserves

13615
Unknown
2-3 billion cubic meters of natural gas
Unknown, needs more investment into
exploration
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Map 2 Oil and gas fields in Crimean EEZ. Source: "As Russia Closes In On Crimea's Energy Resources, What Is Next
For Ukraine?"

Pipelines, bridges, and billions of dollars – how the Kremlin and selected group of prominent
Russian businessmen profit from the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula

When Ukraine lost the Crimean Peninsula to Russia in 2014, a Ukrainian company called
Chornomornaftogaz and all of its assets were transferred to the Russian state-owned company
Gazprom. The confiscation was very swift – Gazprom sent a group of trusted employees to take
over the Chornomornaftogaz’s headquarters, and Russian naval personnel, without any insignia
in their uniforms, took over the oil and gas rigs under their control. Immediately after the
seizure, Ukraine lost approximately 2 billion cubic meters of stored gas. Ukrainian media has
reported that by 2018, “Russia seized some 7 billion cubic meters of natural gas from nine
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producing fields around Crimea since the annexation.” Over half of the gas was extracted from
the Odesa gas field.102 This was a rather serious hit for Ukraine because it produces only about
20 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year and consumes over 30 billion cubic meters per
annum.103
Ukraine’s former Energy and Coal Industry Minister has said that Ukraine’s initial losses
are about $300 billion if all energy facilities in Crimea are included. This number does not
contain the potential revenue gained from extracting gas or oil from the Black Sea. Ukraine has
said that it will try to get back Chernomornaftogaz’s annexed equipment by officially declaring
it stolen. However, it is unlikely that Ukraine will ever see the equipment again – possible legal
fights could take years and/or Russia could simply not honor the possible decision made by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Predictably, after the annexation, Ukraine lost all of its
deals with foreign energy companies regarding the Crimean hydrocarbon business. For
example, in 2013, ExxonMobil, Shell, and few other sizeable firms signed a “production
agreement for Crimean Skifska offshore block, pledging to invest $400 million in the initial
exploration…in a deal worth more than $12 billion.”104 This agreement was terminated
immediately after the events in 2014.
Some argue that the “consortium led by Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell may have
strongly predisposed Russia to support the referendum, which resulted in the reunion of
Crimea with Russia.”105 Although this is a viable theory, I would argue that the Skifska gas field,
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which is estimated to hold over 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas, is just one piece of the
Crimean puzzle, since there are numerous lucrative oil and gas fields in the Crimean EEZ. It is
more likely that Russia simply needed to find new gas and oil sources after the new energy deal
with China was signed.
As Biersack and O’Lear argue, there is a “silent, though evident, connection between
Crimea’s annexation and Russia’s shift eastward for energy.”106 In recent years, Russia has
signed multiple deals with China, worth almost half a trillion U.S. dollars. For example, the
contracts include the construction of a new pipeline and 30-year-long transportation
agreements for supplying roughly 40 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China National
Petroleum Corp. The Russian counterpart in both of these deals is Gazprom. There are two
primary reasons why Crimea is vital for this historic bilateral energy agreement.
First, it has been argued that “the monumental gas agreement reached between China
and Russia on 21 May [2014] appeared to be catalyzed by the annexation on Crimea.”107 In
other words, immediately after Russia was sure that it would gain access to the untapped Black
Sea energy reserves, it was ready to sign the contract with China. Moreover, since China’s
natural gas consumption has risen by almost 2000 percent in the last 40 years, and is
anticipated to grow at least until 2050, I predict that a large share of Crimean natural gas will
find its way to China.108 It is not today that the natural gas from Crimea will literally be going to
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China. Rather, the point is that Russia’s overall gas production capacity has increased after it
took over Crimea.
The second reason why Crimea is so important for the Russia-China contract is that
Russia will be forced to compete against other gas suppliers in China. It would be “safe to
assume that Russian gas to China will be sold at lower margins compared to European
shipments.”109 Thus, since Russia now controls the vast gas reserves in the Crimean Exclusive
Economic Zone, Russia will be able to afford to cut prices for the Chinese gas deliveries. The
speed at which Russia and China signed the deal after the annexation of Crimea indicates that
Russia was desperately looking for a way to offset the price cuts in China (the deal has been in
the works from 2006).
The Russia-China natural gas contract is also an excellent example of how the Kremlin
rewards Putin’s close allies with very lucrative government contracts. As mentioned above, the
construction of a pipeline is one part of the contract. There have been estimates that the “cost
of constructing processing facilities and pipeline to China will cost Russia $70 billion.”110
Reportedly, China offered a loan of $50 billion for the construction of the pipeline up to the
Chinese border.111 The name of the pipeline is the Power of Siberia, and it runs for over 8000
kilometers across Russia and China. For the purpose of this study, I will concentrate on the
approximately 3000-kilometer stretch that runs within Russia. The following pages are devoted
to examining how Vladimir Putin's close allies have been able to get their hands on the Chinese
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$50 billion loan given to the Russian government and how the Kremlin has rewarded Putin's
associates with enormous infrastructural projects in the Crimean Peninsula.
Gennady Timchenko is often regarded as one of the most influential people in Russia.
With a net worth of over 20 billion U.S. dollars, he is also one of the wealthiest people on the
planet.112 Timchenko made his fortune in the 1990s when he began trading oil in St. Petersburg.
Subsequently, Timchenko co-founded a company called Gunvor, which eventually became “one
of the world’s largest independent commodity trading companies involved in the oil and energy
markets.”113 Timchenko is also Vladimir Putin’s close friend and associate, and Putin is said to
have investments in Gunvor. In fact, the men are so close that some call Timchenko Putin’s
personal wallet.114 It is a commonly accepted consensus that Putin’s emerging political career in
St. Petersburg in the 1990s gave Timchenko and his companies an incredible boost in the
Russian business sector.
Since then, Timchenko has attained significant or total control in multiple sizeable
Russian businesses. For example, Gennady Timchenko holds major positions in Bank Rossiya
(Russian bank), Sobinbank (Russian bank), Volga Group (investment and holding company),
Novatek (Russia’s second-largest natural gas producer), Avia Group (company in business
aviation sector), Sakhatrans (coal transportation company), Transoil (oil and oil product
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transportation company), Aquanika (Russian manufacturer of mineral water and soft drinks),
and Stroytransgaz (construction company).115
Timchenko is directly affiliated with the Power of Siberia pipeline through his
Stroytransgaz company. The firm was one of the main contractors of the entire pipeline project
within the Russian borders.116 Moreover, another oligarch named Arkady Rotenberg, and his
brother Boris, were also deeply involved in the Power of Siberia pipeline deal. Arkady’s
construction company Stroygazmontazh was the other main contractor in the agreement and it
“built a 1126-km-long section of the gas pipeline from the Neryungri district of the Republic of
Sakha (Yakutia) to the border of the People’s Republic of China.”117
This is an excellent example of how national and private interests are intertwined – the
Russian government signs a deal with another entity (in this case exporting gas to China), China
provides a loan, and the Kremlin awards construction and maintenance projects to Russian
companies controlled by Putin’s allies. With a single contract Russia is able to increase its
exports, gain geopolitical influence, receive a gigantic loan with favorable interest, and transfer
government money to Putin’s inner circle. It should be mentioned that officially, there is always
a tender for these enormous government-sponsored projects, but every year the same group of
companies win the bids. For example, in 2014, Rotenberg’s Stroygazmontazh won 279 out of
374 tenders. The aggregate value of the bids Stroygazmontazh attained was approximately 230
billion rubles ($3.5 billion).118
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The Rotenberg brothers, Arkady and Boris, have a total net worth of over $4 billion.
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, “both brothers have amassed enormous
amounts of wealth during the years of Putin’s rule in Russia.”119 For example, Rotenbergs were
given contracts worth over $7 billion for constructing infrastructure for the Sochi Winter
Olympics in 2014. It is often said that the Rotenberg brothers are Putin’s closest allies. In fact,
Putin has known the brothers since the early 1960s. Arkady Rotenberg first met Putin at a judo
club in 1963. They “became sparring partners and friends, and have remained close ever
since.”120 At a later date the two traveled across the Soviet Union and became even closer.
Once Putin started working in the St. Petersburg’s mayor’s office in the 1990s, the Rotenberg
brothers started gaining various government-sponsored grants for their business projects.
Today, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg are linked to a number of prominent companies in
Russia, including the SMP bank, Investcapitalbank, Stroygazmontazh, and Mostotrest. Especially
the older brother Arkady has become a central player in the Russian construction business.
Among other things, he is involved in the highway, gas pipeline, and bridge projects. What is
more, Arkady’s son Igor Rotenberg has also become a successful construction mogul in Russia.
For example, in 2015, Igor’s company was given over a billion-dollar contract to build toll
system infrastructure on Russian highways.121
Arkady Rotenberg’s latest project, and the one most relevant to this study, is the giant
Kerch Strait Bridge connecting the Crimean Peninsula with mainland Russia. The bridge is
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almost 19 kilometers long, making it the longest bridge in Europe. Besides its strategic
importance, the Crimean Bridge has a significant symbolic meaning for the Russian public; it
“marks the physical reunification of Crimea with the Russian mainland.”122 For Arkady
Rotenberg, however, the importance of the bridge is also deeply financial. RIA Novosti, a
Russian state-owned news agency, reported that the cost of the bridge was approximately $3.4
billion, although the real cost is probably well over $4 billion.123
The bridge contract, which was entirely paid for by the Russian government, was given
to Stroygazmontazh, Arkady Rotenberg’s construction company. Other smaller contracts were
also handed out, for example, to Rotenberg’s Mostotrest, a company specialized in the
“construction and overhaul of road, rail and city bridges and highways.”124 Furthermore,
Rotenberg’s companies also secured the contract for building the railway line on the bridge
(worth approximately $285 million).125 These companies have been magnificent cash cows for
Rotenberg: in the last ten years, the overall revenue of Rotenberg’s companies has been well
over $10 billion.
When examining Russian building projects, whether a gas pipeline or bridge project,
certain peculiarities persist year after year. Most notably, Russian infrastructure projects seem
to cost way more than similar projects in other parts of the world. For example, when Gazprom
built (contracted with other companies) new pipelines in Russia in the 2010s, “they were two to
three times more expensive than equivalent projects in Europe, even when they were in
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temperate, accessible areas in southern Russia.”126 In other words, there seems to be a serious
issue with a rather blatant price inflation when something gets built in Russia. Thus, it would
not be unreasonable to assume that Russian taxpayers probably heftily overpaid for the Kerch
Strait Bridge.
In light of the above facts, it is rather easy to argue that corruption is very widespread in
Russia. In fact, corruption has reached humorous levels. In 2014, for instance, Vladimir Putin
was the mastermind behind the ‘purge’ of schoolbooks in Russia. The first step was to sell the
state-owned textbook provider to private individuals, in this case, Arkady Rotenberg. The
second step was to make the company the sole provider of textbooks for Russian schools by
eliminating any competition it could face. Fortunately, there is evidence that the Kremlin is
using some of its resources to fight corruption; in 2019, a company called Granat LLP was given
a renewable contract worth almost $700,000 to “conduct training on civil-society development
and combating corruption.”127 128 Interestingly, Granat LLP is owned by Arkady Rotenberg.
As I have argued, the Kremlin is very generous in handing out contracts to Vladimir
Putin’s friends. Moreover, since the Crimean Peninsula plays such an important role for the
Kremlin, I hypothesize that the Kerch Strait Bridge is only the first major government-sponsored
project being done in Crimea. There are endless possibilities for how Putin could reward his
allies, whether with infrastructural building contracts on the land or building and developing
the gas and oil pipeline networks in the Exclusive Economic Zone on the Black Sea shelf.
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Furthermore, since in the late 2019, Arkady Rotenberg sold the entire Stroygazmontazh
to the state-owned Gazprom for $1.18 billion (making over $700 million in profit), it would be
safe to assume that at least some of the future building contracts in Crimea will be given to
Gennadi Timchenko’s Stroytransgaz.129 130 On the other hand, this buyout could mean that the
Kremlin is slowly changing the way on how it handles enormous government-sponsored
construction projects. Some have even argued that “Putin is institutionalizing control of the way
state funds are spent on mega-projects.”131 Nonetheless, corruption and informal politics are so
deeply rooted in the Russian business culture that it is extremely hard to see any drastic
changes happening in the near future, especially because Russia is facing a critical power
transition in the upcoming years.132
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Conclusion

In this thesis, I have analyzed how Russia uses its hydrocarbon resources as a foreign policy
tool. As one of the most significant gas and oil producers in the world, Russia has gained
enormous political power in many nations. In short, for many years, Russia has been building
asymmetrical economic relationships with multiple countries, including countries in the
European Union. Many of these countries have become partially or entirely dependent on
Russian energy. In other words, they have become victims of the Russian ‘energy weapon.’ It is
true that, financially, Russia profits enormously from hydrocarbon exports, but scholars also
agree that for Russia, gaining political power by selling hydrocarbon resources is just as
important. Another way of gaining political influence in a foreign country is to offer subsidies on
energy exports. This tactic has been used primarily in former Soviet countries, mainly because
their economies are rather weak, and they have very little choice under Russia’s ever-growing
pressure.
This thesis has also argued that corruption, informal politics, and Vladimir Putin's
network of close acquaintances are deeply rooted in the contemporary Russian business
culture. For example, Russian state-owned energy companies such as Gazprom, Rosneft, and
Transneft all have Putin's close allies as board members and therefore the Kremlin is able to
directly control virtually all major Russian hydrocarbon exporters. Furthermore, I have argued
that no matter what business Russia does, including exporting cheap gas and oil in return for
political influence, selling arms in Africa, or building gigantic infrastructural projects in Crimea,
Putin's close allies always get their 'fair' share of the pie. Thus, the following question was
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asked: "who really benefits from Russia's natural resources - the Russian nation or a selected
group of influential businessmen close to the Kremlin?" In order to answer this, a rigorous
analysis of Russia's role in Crimea and Africa was conducted.
Due to the fundamental nature of the Russian political system (informal channels,
corruption, patron-client relationships, for example), no final answer can be given. However, by
process of elimination, a satisfactory conclusion can be drawn. First, it is highly unlikely that the
Kremlin would allow any action that would threaten the existence of the Russian citizens, no
matter how much money can be made. For example, sending private military contractors for
military operations to foreign countries without Moscow’s consent, could lead to a serious
international crisis, thereby endangering the lives of Russian citizens.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that the Kremlin would not use disproportionate
amounts of government funds to only enrich Putin’s allies. For instance, even though some
infrastructural projects in Russia have been significantly more expensive than similar projects in
Europe, usually something tangible and utilizable gets built. One of the best examples is the
2014 Sochi Olympics; gigantic contracts were handed out to the construction companies of
Putin’s acquaintances, but in the end, Russian citizens benefited from enjoying the Olympic
Games in their country. Moreover, the infrastructure that was built for the Olympics can be
used for other events as well. Another example is the Kerch Strait bridge project, which was
very expensive and enriched Putin’s allies via construction contracts. This same bridge is used
daily by people going in and out of the Crimea. Thus, it is my conclusion that the beneficiaries of
Russia’s natural riches, on which the entire Russian economy is very dependent, are the
aforementioned oligarchs, as well as the Russian nation as a whole. Naturally, one could
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question the fairness of this kind of distribution of wealth, but that kind of debate is beyond the
scope of this particular research.
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Appendix

Russia's exports to Africa (Billion US $)
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11

10.4

9.47

9.4

9.12

7.55
6.01

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Figure 1 Russia's exports to Africa. Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity
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Figure 2 Russia has interest in many African countries (countries in red). Sources: "The Kremlin's Campaign in Africa: Assessment
Update" and "Russia is Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa."
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Country

Details

Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Egypt

Peace-keeping and military training.
Cooperation on countering terrorism.
Cooperation on counterterrorism and joint training of troops.
Military and technical cooperation.
Training of armed forces.
Anti-terrorism cooperation and joint training exercises.
Deliveries of equipment and weapons for counter-terrorism
operations.
Supply of weapons, maintenance and other military assistance
Training and cooperation on peacekeeping and counterterrorism
and anti-piracy efforts.
Training of armed forces, deliveries of military equipment.
Military and technical cooperation.
Cooperation on peacekeeping, counterterrorism, search and
rescue at sea.
Deliveries of military equipment, spare parts and component.
Working meetings of military experts and cooperation on military
education.
Supply of weapons and other military equipment.
Supply of weapons and other military equipment as well as the
provision of other military technical assistance.
Develop the Sudanese armed forces.
Arms shipments as well as joint training and research and
development.
Provisions for the supply of weapons and delivery of spare parts.
Supply of weapons and cooperation on producing military
products.

Eswatini
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Tanzania
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Figure 3 Military cooperation agreements between Russia and African countries since 2015. Source "Russia is Stepping Up its
Military Cooperation in Africa."
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